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This paper examines principles of market design as 
applied to electricity markets. I illustrate the principles 
with examples of both good and bad designs. I discuss one 
of the main design challenges—dealing with market 
power. I then discuss FERC’s choice of a standard market 
design. 
1. Introduction 
In recent years, the use of complex auctions to allocate 
scarce resources has grown tremendously. The growth 
stems in part from technological advances, which greatly 
reduce the cost of conducting such auctions, and in part 
from the deregulation of several infrastructure industries, 
which puts a premium on using market-based methods to 
allocate resources. This paper examines the recent 
experience with high-stake auctions in deregulated 
industries, especially energy and telecommunications. 
Lessons in market design are drawn from this experience.  
Good market design is crucial to the success of these 
markets. Good market design identifies the critical issues, 
and then addresses them as simply as possible, but not 
more simply. For example, the simultaneous ascending 
auction commonly used in spectrum auctions worked well 
because of its excellent price discovery, which allowed 
bidders to arbitrage across substitutes, and allowed the 
piecing together of complementary packages. In electricity 
markets, poor designs have arisen from attempts to 
oversimplify the problem: the use of a single settlement, 
rather than multiple settlements; the use of single-part 
bids, rather than three-part bids; and the use of a single 
price, rather than locational marginal prices.  
Inadequate attention was paid to the implications of 
market power. Designs that magnified, rather than 
mitigated, the problem of market power were common: 
forbidding forward trades in California and creating easily 
manipulated capacity markets in New England. In all 
markets, the absence of a demand response has contributed 
enormously to the vulnerability of the markets to the 
exercise of market power. It is essential that at least some 
electricity consumers have an incentive to see and respond 
to the real-time price of electricity. 
In the United States, the initial approach of the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to electricity 
restructuring was based in part on wishful thinking, as 
captured by the phrase: “Let a thousand flowers bloom.” In 
the absence of a clear consensus on how markets should be 
restructured, FERC encouraged each market to come up 
with its own design. Although the design efforts were 
extensive, most of the designs had serious flaws.  
The flawed designs should not be a surprise. Electricity 
market design is complex and not well understood. But 
perhaps the biggest impediment to good design is the fact 
that the designs were created by committees of 
stakeholders. Just as one should be hesitant to fly on an 
airplane designed by a committee of stakeholders, one 
should be hesitant to trust electricity designs that are built 
from consensus among interested parties. Like airplanes, 
electricity designs should be largely the work of experts 
focused solely on the objectives of the market. The 
compromise inherent in the design should reflect the 
optimum balance among competing design objectives, 
rather than a distributional compromise among those with 
conflicting interests. 
Faced  with more weeds than flowers, FERC has 
abandoned its hands-off approach in favor of a standard 
market design. The standard design will accomplish two 
things. It will eliminate as many flaws as possible, and it 
will encourage trade across regional markets. Perhaps the 
greatest motivation for restructuring is the recognition that 
there potentially are large gains in both efficiency and 
reliability from expanding the geographic scope of 
electricity markets. These gains are lost to the extent that 
incompatible market designs prevent trades across regional 
markets. 
In this paper, I examine some principles of market 
design. I illustrate the principles with examples of both 
good and bad designs. I discuss one of the main design 
challenges—dealing with market power. I then examine 
FERC’s choice of a standard market design.  
2. As simple as possible, but not simpler 
Good market design begins with the objective. In the 
case of electricity, the objective is the efficient and reliable 
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production of electricity to satisfy demand. This objective 
includes both short-run elements (least-cost daily 
production) and long-run elements (induce efficient 
investment decisions). 
The second critical step in market design is to 
understand the preferences and constraints of market 
participants. This requires a knowledge of the basic 
economics facing suppliers and demanders. Without this 
knowledge, one cannot begin to assess what design 
elements are essential and what are unnecessary. Good 
knowledge of the underlying environment enables the 
designer to keep the design as simple as possible, while 
avoiding the common error of oversimplifying the design. 
A number of examples illustrate this principle. 
The importance of price discovery 
As an example of a successful design, consider the 
simultaneous ascending auction used to auction 
telecommunications spectrum licenses in the U.S. and 
elsewhere. In these auctions, the government is auctioning 
a number of related licenses to firms that hope to provide 
wireless communications services. The primary objective 
of the government is to get the licenses in the hands of 
those companies that value them the most. The difficulty is 
that some of the licenses are complements and some are 
substitutes, and the structure of preferences may differ 
across the bidders.  
In the simultaneous ascending auction, all the licenses 
are on the block at the same time. The auction proceeds in 
a number of rounds with prices on each license ascending 
in response to bids. In each round, bidders can bid on any 
of the licenses. The auction ends when no bidder is willing 
to bid higher on any of the licenses. 
The success of this design stems from its solving the 
most important problem bidders face. Bidders must decide 
what package of licenses they should acquire, given their 
valuations and budget constraints. The virtue of this design 
is its excellent price discovery. The bidders get to observe 
prices throughout the auction and this information 
gradually improves as the auction proceeds. Good price 
information allows the bidders to arbitrage across 
substitute licenses. Price information also allows the 
bidders to piece together complementary packages of 
licenses.  
Most designs face some basic tradeoffs and the 
simultaneous ascending auction is no exception. The 
source of price discovery—the revelation of all bids 
throughout the process—can also promote undesirable 
collusive bidding strategies. For example, the bidding can 
be used as a mechanism to decide who should win what, 
without the determination resting on price competition. In 
some auctions, where collusive behavior is thought to be 
an important issue it makes sense to limit this possibility 
by, for example, not disclosing bidder identities. 
Another important tradeoff in the simultaneous 
ascending auction is the decision to allow bidding on 
individual licenses only, rather than allow the bidders to 
bid directly for packages of licenses. Restricting the 
bidding to individual licenses greatly simplifies the design, 
but it exposes bidders to risks if there are strong 
complementarities. Then a bidder may win some of what it 
needs, without realizing the complementarities it hoped 
for. If licenses are primarily substitutes or the structure of 
complements differs little across bidders, then allowing 
bidding only on individual licenses is a useful 
simplification. But if complementarities are large and 
different across bidders then such a simplification is likely 
to impair  efficiency. Letting bidders bid directly on 
packages of licenses is better. 
Day-ahead bids should be financially binding 
Similar tradeoffs are seen in electricity market design. 
Here the tendency to settle on designs that are too simple 
has been a common mistake.  
One example is the single settlement system adopted in 
New England and elsewhere. In a single-settlement 
system, participants submit bids one day ahead. The bids 
are used to establish the supply schedule for the next day 
that satisfies demand at least cost subject to reliability 
constraints. Suppliers are paid the energy clearing price in 
each hour that they produce. However, the clearing price is 
calculated based on the bids and resources that are 
available in real time. Participants can change their bids 
and availability until the last moment without penalty. This 
creates an incentive for gaming. For example, a supplier 
may decide close to real time to withhold or raise its bid 
for a generator that is scheduled day-ahead. The supplier 
may do this to increase the clearing price that it receives. 
As we move closer to real-time, the system becomes less 
responsive as options vanish. The supply curve becomes 
steeper. Hence, the vulnerability to gaming near real time 
is great, especially if a lot of volume is riding on the real 
time prices. 
One solution to this problem is forbidding changes. 
This may be effective for bid changes, but outages are 
often necessary and it is difficult for the regulator to 
distinguish between legitimate outages and those intended 
to raise the price. Also, generators often have good reason 
to change bids in response to export opportunities, revised 
fuel prices, or other changes. 
A better solution is to make the day-ahead schedule 
financially binding. This is called a multiple settlement 
system, since there are at least two sets of prices and 
quantities: those in the day-ahead schedule and those at 
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real time. Having the day-ahead bids financially binding 
does two things. First, it makes the bids credible, since 
successful bids involve a financial commitment. This is a 
general principle of market design. Bids should be 
financially binding. Second, a multiple settlement system 
mitigates incentives to manipulate the real-time price. 
Most of the pricing and allocation is done day-ahead. The 
real-time market is only to price deviations from the day-
ahead plans. Those scheduled day-ahead have no incentive 
to manipulate the real-time price. Rather their incentive is 
to make adjustments to bids in response to changes in their 
economic situation. 
The multiple settlement system illustrates a 
fundamental point about markets. Forward markets play an 
important role in both reducing risk of market participants 
and in reducing incentives to exercise market power. 
Especially in markets like electricity, where the product 
cannot be stored and where generators have limits on how 
quickly they can be started and ramped up or down, both 
supply and demand become more inelastic as we get closer 
to real time. This means that markets closer to real time 
will be both more volatile and more vulnerable to 
manipulation. Hence, both buyers and sellers have an 
incentive to lock in prices and quantities well in advance 
of real time. The market design should encourage such 
forward transactions. Most of the market volume should 
occur well in advance of real time. 
A fundamental flaw in the California design was a rule 
barring the former utilities, which had large load 
obligations, from purchasing power in advance of the day-
ahead market. This restriction exposed the utilities to 
enormous risk and made the market vulnerable to 
manipulation. For disaster to strike, all that was needed 
was a period of tight supply.  
Send the right price signals 
Another market simplification is having a single energy 
clearing price in all locations. This is the approach used in 
New England. Although this approach would be a useful 
simplification in markets without any binding transmission 
constraints, most if not all electricity markets often have 
binding transmission constraints. When transmission 
constraints bind, more expensive generation must be 
dispatched to satisfy the constraint; that is, generation that 
is offered at a price above the energy clearing price must 
be accepted. This out-of-merit generation is paid its bid, 
creating an extra cost that is not recovered from the energy 
clearing price. Instead, this transmission congestion cost is 
paid by all load as uplift (a constant fee per MWh across 
all load). 
The problem with this single price approach is that it 
sends the wrong price signal. In the transmission-
constrained regions, the cost of generating electricity is 
higher than in the unconstrained regions, yet all load pays 
the same price for electricity. Load in the constrained 
regions is in essence being subsidized by the load in the 
unconstrained regions. 
Bidding incentives also are distorted by the single-price 
approach. Generators in the constrained region face pay-
as-bid pricing, rather than uniform pricing. Hence, their 
incentive is to raise their bids to the point where they are 
just accepted, rather than to bid something closer to their 
true cost. The single price approach encourages certain 
types of gaming to create congestion. A supplier may “bid 
for uplift” by creating congestion through its bids and then 
submitting high bids for the units that are needed to relieve 
the congestion. 
The solution is to price congestion by using locational 
marginal prices. Under this approach, the price at each 
location reflects any congestion costs or benefits. Hence, 
the price in congested regions is higher than the price in 
unconstrained regions. Generators are paid and load is 
charged the appropriate locational marginal price. Of 
course, in an unconstrained system all the prices will be 
the same. But as constraints appear the prices adjust to 
reflect congestion costs or benefits from supply or demand 
at the particular location. 
Let the bidders express directly the underlying 
economics 
Another simplification is the use of single-part bids. 
This is done in many markets, including California and 
New England. Suppliers submit an increasing supply 
schedule for each hour. The schedule is intended to reflect 
the marginal cost of operating the unit at various levels. 
The bidders cannot express directly their true preferences, 
which are complicated by start-up costs and no-load costs. 
Consider a bidder with a generating unit that has 
substantial start-up costs. To express the start-up cost 
indirectly the generator must guess how long the unit will 
be asked to run. For units near the margin, an accurate 
guess may be impossible. 
The  solution is to allow multi-part bids in which 
generators bid not only energy but also start-up and no-
load costs. The generator can express directly its true 
preferences. Assuming the bids are truthful, the unit 
commitment optimization will then determine an efficient 
schedule, based on better information about costs. The 
desirability of three-part bids hinges on the system being 
centrally optimized, as in the Eastern US.  
Three-part bidding has an additional advantage in 
electricity markets. Absent market power, bidders are able 
to—and have the incentive to—truthfully bid their costs. 
In contrast, with single-part bids, generators are unable to 
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express their true preferences. This makes market 
monitoring more difficult. With single-part bids, 
generators can justify a high energy bid, well in excess of 
the unit’s marginal cost, by asserting that such a bid is 
necessary to cover start-up and no-load costs given the 
expectations the bidder has about how long the unit is 
likely to run. 
3. Avoid markets with fundamental flaws 
One might think that ill-conceived markets would have 
little chance of surviving a lengthy design process. Surely, 
the most glaring flaws would be identified and eliminated 
before the market is implemented. Unfortunately, this is 
not the case. The experience to date with electricity 
restructuring provides numerous examples of basic market 
flaws not only surviving the design process, but also 
enduring for an extended period after the flaws are 
identified. Typically, some group of market participants 
benefits from the flaws, and if the group is large enough, it 
can block moves to correct the problem.  
The capacity markets in New England provide a good 
example of markets with basic flaws. When the markets 
opened in May 1998 there were two capacity markets, the 
operable capability (OpCap) market and the installed 
capability (ICap) market. These markets are intended to 
promote reliability by assuring that there is sufficient 
capacity in the system to cover the peak load plus the 
reserve margin. ICap is a monthly market and OpCap is a 
daily market. Any generating unit in New England can 
supply ICap up to its rated capacity. If the unit is operable 
on a particular day, it can also supply OpCap up to its 
rated capacity. Load is required to purchase sufficient ICap 
and OpCap to cover its peak load plus a reserve margin. 
Generators submit bids expressing their willingness to 
supply both products. The clearing price for each product 
is found as the intersection of the aggregate supply curve 
with the vertical demand curve. Generators with bids 
below the clearing price supply the capacity product and 
are paid the clearing price. 
At first glance, this may seem like a sensible design, but 
a closer look reveals that it is fundamentally flawed. One 
basic problem is that the products are defined in such a 
way that they do little to promote reliability—the objective 
of the markets. Reliability comes from having sufficient 
operable resources that are sufficiently flexible to handle 
contingencies as they arise. ICap and OpCap have nothing 
to do with the responsiveness of resources, and little to do 
with a resource’s ability to produce energy consistently 
and at reasonable prices. Flexibility and the ability to 
produce energy are rewarded in the energy and reserve 
markets. As capacity becomes scarce, both energy and 
reserves are priced higher.  
Even if it was thought desirable to further reward 
available capacity beyond what it can receive in the energy 
and reserve markets, these capacity markets are a poor 
method of pricing capacity. Consider the OpCap market. 
This market is bid day-ahead and is cleared after the fact. 
The units that bid below the clearing price are designated 
as providing OpCap and those that bid above are not. 
However, notice that there is no difference in the costs or 
risks incurred by those participants who receive payment 
in the market and those who do not. Winners and losers are 
not identified until well after the “service” has been 
provided by both. Every participant is providing the same 
service, but only those designated are paid. As a result the 
only rational bids in the market are a bid of zero (to insure 
selection in the hope there is a positive price) or a bid that 
is an attempt to set the clearing price. The winning bidders 
are receiving payment for product delivered, but the losing 
bidders are delivering the product as well without 
receiving any payment. 
The true supply curve then is 0 up to the capacity 
available. Hence, the competitive price is either zero when 
there is sufficient capacity or infinity when there is a 
shortage. Intermediate bids and prices are the result of the 
exercise of market power and have nothing to do with the 
cost of providing capacity. It is in this sense that the prices 
in the OpCap market are arbitrary.  
The best way to think of capacity products is as options 
to supply energy. The difficulty with these markets is that 
unlike standard options where the strike price is specified 
in advance, here the seller of the option is able to set its 
strike price ex post through its bid in the energy market. 
Such an option is worthless to the buyer. However, in the 
OpCap market the buyers (load) are required to buy a fixed 
quantity of this worthless product, regardless how high the 
price is. 
Such a market is manipulated easily provided some 
suppliers are sufficiently large and there is not too much 
surplus capacity. This is indeed what happened in both the 
OpCap and ICap markets. Whenever the operable capacity 
became tight, say as the result of outages, OpCap prices 
would become arbitrarily high. The market was eventually 
eliminated, although it operated for over a year. The ICap 
market, which suffers from similar problems, was not 
eliminated until August 2000, over two years after the 
markets began. ICap’s elimination followed a period 
where a few suppliers set the ICap price at levels that were 
arbitrarily high. 
It is remarkable how long these markets persisted. The 
flaws were first identified in a review of the markets that 
was done for the system operator before the markets 
opened [2]. The report recommended the elimination of 
both markets. Not surprisingly suppliers fought for these 
markets as an extra revenue source and were successful for 
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over two years in the case of ICap. Neither market was 
eliminated until it become obvious that the capacity 
markets simply were a means of transferring an arbitrary 
amount of money from load to suppliers. Although ICap 
was eliminated as a market, ICap payments to suppliers 
continue, but the payment is now set administratively 
rather than by the suppliers. 
4. Understand the politics 
The persistence of bad market designs is not surprising 
when one examines the governance structure. In New 
England, market rules are ratified by a committee of 
interested parties. It is especially difficult to make changes 
that would adversely impact a large and organized group 
of participants, such as the suppliers. This is certainly the 
case with the elimination of capacity markets. In such an 
environment, the debate is likely to focus more on issues 
related to the distribution of money among stakeholders, 
rather than issues of efficiency. For greatest impact, 
designers need to propose changes that will benefit all 
major parties. Otherwise, the changes are likely to be 
vetoed. 
5. Address the essential complexities 
The most basic complexity in electricity markets is the 
real-time balance of supply and demand. This is necessary 
because of an inability to efficiently store electricity. The 
task is made difficult because of uncertainties in both 
supply and demand. Supply shocks can be especially large 
and unpredictable as a result of the failure of a large 
generating unit or transmission line. This fact requires that 
the system operator have a significant quantity of flexible 
resources that are quickly able to ramp up or down in 
response to contingencies. Properly rewarding these 
flexible reserve resources is a major challenge of the 
market design. 
A second complexity is a near vertical demand curve. 
Today there is little demand response to price. 
Unresponsive demand is especially a problem because 
supply is highly concentrated in many markets. This 
means that the market is vulnerable to the exercise of 
market power on the supply side, and that the demand side 
is unable to protect itself by curtailing demand in response 
to high prices. Moreover, the problem of market power 
becomes worse as we get closer to real time. The supply 
curve becomes steeper as options vanish closer to real 
time.  
Bidding nonconvexities further complicate the design 
problem. On the supply side, there are start-up and no-load 
costs. Generating units have minimum run times and the 
ability to ramp up and down is limited. These constraints 
create intertemporal dependencies. A unit may have to be 
started and ramped up hours before it is needed. Industrial 
demand may also have intertemporal dependencies, such 
as a plant that requires energy over several adjacent hours 
to complete its production process. 
A fourth source of complexity are network constraints. 
Typically, every action impacts everyone on the network. 
As a result, pricing must reflect the network constraints to 
induce efficient behavior. 
6. Understand incentives 
Almost all electricity markets are structured as uniform-
price auctions. The auction determines a clearing price that 
balances supply and demand, and all supply offers below 
the clearing-price are accepted. This form of auction is 
vulnerable to the exercise of market power. Large 
suppliers have an incentive to reduce the quantity that they 
offer in order to get a higher price on their remaining 
quantity [1]. 
The problem of market power is exacerbated in current 
electricity markets by three factors. First, the response of 
demand to price is often negligible. The suppliers face a 
nearly vertical demand curve, because end consumers 
neither see nor pay the wholesale price. This greatly 
increases the profitability of price manipulation, since the 
higher price does not lead to a curtailment in demand. 
Second, the variability of supply and demand means that 
there inevitably are times when supply is tight, especially 
as we move closer to real time. Even small suppliers can 
influence price in these circumstances. Third, the markets 
sometimes suffer from excessive concentration in areas 
with transmission constraints. The transmission constraints 
may imply that demand must be met from just a few 
suppliers. These dominant suppliers often have both the 
incentive and ability to manipulate prices. 
Forward contracts play an important role in mitigating 
the incentive to exercise market power. A supplier that has 
sold 100% of its generation forward has no interest in 
manipulating the spot price. And indeed both suppliers and 
demanders have an interest in forward contracts, since the 
contracts reduce the risks of both parties. The forward 
contracts are financial contracts enabling the parties to 
lock in acceptable prices. Importantly, the contracts do not 
require physical delivery. Both parties can make 
adjustments in response to changed circumstances. For 
example, a supplier may decide to satisfy its load 
obligation through spot purchases, whenever the spot price 
is below the supplier’s costs. Ideally, the spot price only is 
used to price deviations from positions taken in forward 
markets. Less is riding on the spot price and so the 
incentive to manipulate it is greatly reduced. 
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The pricing rule affects behavior 
It is sometimes argued that switching from uniform 
pricing to pay-as-bid pricing will reduce the incentive to 
exercise market power. See [3] for a more detailed 
treatment of this issue. With uniform pricing, the bidder 
recognizes the possibility that its bid may set the clearing 
price it receives for the entire quantity it wins. This gives 
the supplier an incentive to overstate its costs and for the 
overstatement to increase in the quantity bid. With pay-as-
bid pricing, the supplier’s bid on the last MW does not 
impact what the supplier is paid on the earlier MWs; 
hence, the incentive to overstate does not grow with 
quantity. However, it does not follow that the exercise of 
market power will be less under pay-as-bid pricing. 
What we do know is that the bidding incentives depend 
fundamentally on the pricing rule.  
With pay-as-bid pricing, the bidder’s incentive is to bid 
as close to the clearing price as possible. Indeed, the pay-
as-bid auction may be renamed “Guess the Clearing 
Price.” The pay-as-bid auction rewards those that can best 
guess the clearing price. Typically, this favors larger 
companies that can spend more on forecasting, and are 
more likely to set the clearing price as a result of their size.  
In sharp contrast, uniform pricing favors the smaller 
companies (or those with small unhedged positions going 
into the market). With uniform pricing, the big suppliers 
make room for the smaller rivals. The small suppliers are 
able to free-ride on the exercise of market power by the 
large suppliers. 
Thus, the exercise of market power with pay-as-bid 
pricing by favoring larger bidders will tend to encourage 
consolidation and discourage entry; whereas the exercise 
of market power with uniform pricing encourages entry 
and reduces concentration. As a result, the market may 
evolve to more competitive structures under uniform 
pricing. This self-correcting feature of uniform pricing is 
especially valuable in markets like electricity that are 
repeated regularly. 
Pay-as-bid pricing has a further disadvantage stemming 
from the “Guess the Clearing Price” incentives. The 
guesses may be wrong. In particular, a low-cost unit may 
guess that the clearing price will be higher than it turns out 
to be. As a result, more expensive units will be scheduled 
in its place. Hence, the dispatch is likely less efficient 
under pay-as-bid pricing at least in the absence of market 
power. 
7. Demand response is essential 
We argued above that demand response is important in 
mitigating market power. Indeed, some demand response 
is essential in avoiding market failure in situations of 
inadequate supply. In such circumstances, if the demand 
curve is truly vertical it is not possible to determine a price 
that clears the market. A demand response solves this 
practical problem. But equally important demand response 
can greatly improve reserve markets. Demand response is 
a form of reserves, providing the flexibility that the ISO 
needs to balance supply and demand in real time. Even a 
little demand response will go a long way in improving the 
energy and reserve markets. The experience in other 
markets suggests that people respond to prices if they see 
and feel them. Real time metering is an essential 
prerequisite. This should happen quickly for industry and 
more slowly for residential customers. 
One of the arguments against demand response is that 
consumers of electricity should not be exposed to the high 
volatility of the spot market. But this argument misses the 
important role of forward contracts. A consumer can have 
a forward contract that locks in a price for 100 percent of 
its anticipated electricity needs. The consumer is exposed 
to the spot market only to the extent that its needs change. 
The consumer, however, does have the incentive to curtail 
its demand when prices are high and expand its demand 
when prices are low. Market efficiency only requires that 
the consumer see and pay the spot price on the margin. By 
shifting demand away from high-priced hours to low-
priced hours, the consumer can reduce both the electricity 
bill and its variance.  
Arguably most of the efficiency gains from 
restructuring will come from the demand side. It is the 
demand side that has received almost no attention; 
whereas, even before restructuring, substantial effort went 
into achieving least-cost dispatch among suppliers. 
Unfortunately, nearly all markets have paid too little 
attention to the demand side, and many markets began by 
effectively killing retail competition. This is unfortunate, 
since the much needed innovation on demand management 
systems and contracts is likely to come from retail 
competition. 
The common political response to restructuring was to 
guarantee that consumers would benefit. The restructuring 
legislation often would include a rate cut for consumers in 
the early years. For example in Massachusetts, consumers 
were given a 15 percent rate cut. Companies wishing to 
supply to retail customers had to offer consumers rates that 
beat this 15 percent rate cut to get them to switch from the 
former utilities. No companies could beat this regulated 
rate and make a profit, so retail competition was 
nonexistent.  
The same thing happened in California, but with an 
important difference. In Massachusetts, the former utilities 
were protected from price risk. If the cost of supplying 
load was greater than the regulated rates, then the former 
utilities would be compensated for actual costs through a 
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charge that would be added to consumers’ bills over a 
period of years. In this way retail competition was 
eliminated but without any price risk for the former 
utilities. In contrast, in California, the utilities’ retail 
revenues were fixed at the regulated rates. The utilities did 
not receive any additional compensation in the event 
wholesale prices exceeded the regulated rates. This 
together with the fact that the utilities were not allowed to 
purchase power in forward contracts meant that the 
utilities were exposed to enormous price risk. When 
wholesale prices rose, it was simply a matter of time 
before the utilities ran out of money and the market 
collapsed. 
8. FERC Standard Market Design 
In testimony before the US Senate Committee on 
Energy and Natural Resources (September 17, 2002), Pat 
Wood, Chairman of FERC, conceded, “The wholesale 
power market today has many of the worst features of both 
regulated and competitive markets, and few of the benefits 
of either.” FERC’s “let a thousand flowers bloom” 
approach to market design had failed. In its place, FERC 
has proposed a Standard Market Design to be applied 
throughout the United States. 
The move to a standard market design is compelling. 
Stable and consistent market rules will encourage 
investment and promote efficient trade across market 
boundaries. Most importantly, the final design will be the 
result of extensive study and debate, and will be informed 
by the past successes and failures of actual markets around 
the world. Ideally, the design will include all key 
ingredients of success and avoid the flaws that have led to 
market failures. 
Below I summarize key elements of the design as 
proposed in FERC’s Notice of Proposed Rule Making on 
Standard Market Design (July 31, 2002). I then comment 
on one of the features that is not adequately described. 
Forward bilateral transactions will be central in the 
market, accounting for vast majority of the volume. These 
trades will be supported by (1) a forward market for 
congestion revenue rights to hedge transmission 
congestion risk, and (2) day-ahead and real-time markets 
for energy and reserves. The day-ahead and real-time 
markets are financially-binding security-constrained 
market-clearing auctions for energy and reserves. To 
manage congestion and send the right price signals, 
locational marginal prices are used. Units are paid the 
higher of market-clearing prices or bid cost recovery over 
the day. This is effectively the system that has been in 
operation in PJM and New York, and is planned for 
several other regions. 
The markets are run by an Independent Transmission 
Provider (ITP), which typically will be the Regional 
Transmission Organization (RTO). Currently there are 
four RTOs covering the US and much of Canada. The ITP 
must be independent of any stakeholders. Only the ITP can 
file with FERC. Stakeholders provide input to the ITP, but 
cannot force decisions. This is much stronger 
independence than we have had in current markets. 
Means for market power mitigation and monitoring are 
included in the rule. A bid cap of $1000 applies to energy 
and reserve markets. More stringent price caps are applied 
in situations of market power, say where a unit must run 
for reliability. Automatic mitigation procedures, which 
impose additional limits on bids based on past behavior 
and the unit’s characteristics, may be used as well. 
Transmission planning is a central activity of the ITP. 
Transmission expansions are paid for by those that benefit 
from the transmission, rather than where the transmission 
is located. Access to the grid is rationed by price and on a 
nondiscriminatory basis. Additional access charges cannot 
be added when the transaction crosses market borders. 
Demand response is recognized as critical to both 
reliability and the mitigation of market power. Demand 
response is put on equal footing with supply and 
transmission expansion plans. 
Resource adequacy is a planning function 
Capacity requirements, which appear as ICap markets 
in New England, PJM, and New York, are eliminated. 
Instead, the rule treats resource adequacy as largely a 
planning function of the ITP. Supply and demand are 
forecast and then the ITP assures that it has sufficient 
resources including demand response to meet demand and 
the reserve margin, which FERC sets at 12 percent. Load 
Serving Entities (LSEs) are assigned their share of demand 
and must have lined up sufficient supply and demand 
response to cover their peak demand plus the reserve 
margin. If  an LSE is short, then it faces a stiff penalty at 
times the resources prove inadequate and/or its customers 
are shut off. 
This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, it is 
unclear what it means to have sufficient resources lined up. 
One implementation would be similar to ICap markets and 
fraught with all the ICap problems. Second, shutting off 
the customers of an LSE that is short provides strange 
incentives, since doing so punishes the LSE’s customers, 
not the LSE. 
Since FERC recognizes that resource adequacy is a 
planning function, FERC should look for a solution that 
directly solves the problem at the planning level. Hence, if 
the ITP finds looking forward two to five years that 
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resources are inadequate, then the ITP should hold an 
auction to procure the extra resources that are needed. The 
auction would effectively subsidize the new additions an 
amount just sufficient to get the needed resources built.  
With this approach resource adequacy could be more 
sophisticated than simply peak load plus 12 percent. The 
planning process could identify particular resources that 
are under provided in the market. For example, in New 
England, peaking units and demand response appear to be 
under provided in the market (the incremental value of 
these resources to the ITP is greater than the profits the 
resources can generate). The ITP could have auctions for 
each under-provided resource. 
There are at least two practical difficulties with this 
approach. First, planning is difficult. Planned resources 
may or may not appear. There is likely to be disagreement 
about what resources are under provided. The second 
problem is that by only subsidizing new resources, there 
may be an incentive to move existing resources out of the 
market. For example, a peaking unit might be moved from 
one RTO to secure the subsidy in another, creating a 
greater need for peaking units in the original RTO. This 
problem is solved by subsidizing all peaking units, new or 
existing, at the same level. Although the cost of the 
subsidy would be greater in this case, it is still much less 
than it would be under ICap, which treats all MWs as 
equivalent. In practice, reliable, fast, and flexible resources 
help much more with reliability, than unreliable, slow, and 
inflexible resources. There is no reason to compensate all 
MWs in the same way, and certainly not by a pricing 
mechanism that is manipulated easily.  
A planning approach to resource adequacy, with 
targeted subsidies for under-provided resources, appears 
far superior to an approach derived from the failed ICap 
markets. 
9. Conclusion 
Good market design begins with a thorough 
understanding of the market participants, their incentives, 
and the economic problem that the market is trying to 
solve. With this understanding in place, a good design 
follows almost from common sense. Certainly, many of 
the fatal flaws in actual electricity markets become 
obvious when the problem is analyzed in the right way. 
Why then do these flaws so often appear and persist?  
One explanation is that common sense is scarce. The 
design problems actually are much trickier than meets the 
eye. There are many ways to look at the problem and only 
in hindsight does the problem become obvious. This is 
especially true in electricity markets, where the markets 
necessary are highly complex and many of the design 
problems involve serious challenges. The optimal design 
of reserve markets is a good example. Even after years of 
study and experience these markets are not well 
understood. 
A second explanation for the appearance and 
persistence of design flaws has to do with the design 
process. In the case of electricity this process has most 
often been design by a committee of interested parties. 
More often than not, design proposals were motivated by 
special interests. The final designs involved a bargaining 
compromise that tended to focus on the split of gains 
among special interests, rather than a design that best 
achieved the market’s objective. Fortunately, FERC 
recognizes and addresses this problem head-on in the 
proposed Standard Market Design. The design mandates 
features where there is a consensus about what works well, 
and establishes a governance structure that will avoid the 
obvious conflicts of interest that can undermine efficient 
market operation. 
There are still many challenges in electricity 
restructuring, but FERC appears now to be exercising the 
leadership that will be required to meet these challenges. 
The California disaster, by illustrating just how high the 
stakes are, gave FERC the political will to act. Consumers 
across the country will ultimately benefit from improved 
electricity markets. 
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